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The Supreme Court’s most recent set of arbitration law rulings —
Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l,1 Rent-A-Center West v.
Jackson,2 and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion3 — merits all the
attention it has been receiving. Taken collectively, the three
decisions evidence the powerful commitment of a Supreme Court
majority to arbitration as an alternative form of dispute resolution —
a commitment so strong as to override important consumer welfare
interests. At a minimum, the trilogy erects substantial barriers to the
conduct of class arbitration, a form of arbitration that consumer
advocates regard as essential to protecting consumer welfare.4
In this article, I wish to gauge the doctrinal importance of the three

* Walter Gellhorn Professor of Law and Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law,
Columbia Law School; Director of the Center for International Commercial and
Investment Arbitration, Columbia Law School.
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
2. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
4. While Stolt-Nielsen was not a consumer case, its central and defining
element was the Court’s determination that a dispute could not proceed on a class
arbitration basis unless the underlying contract contemplated it. The Court was
necessarily aware of the fact that efforts at class arbitration are especially
prominent in the consumer arbitration context, and that whatever position it would
take in Stolt-Nielsen on the availability of class arbitration would exert its greatest
effect on consumer cases. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (“[I]t follows that a
party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless
there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”).
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rulings in terms both of their departure from long-established axioms
of arbitration and the definitiveness with which they have disposed
of the politically charged issues they address. I conclude that these
decisions are both bold and deeply flawed, but that they also leave
open possibilities for advocates and courts that are inclined to resist
the sharp movement in the law that the trilogy represents.5

RENT-A-CENTERWEST V. JACKSON
The Court granted certiorari in Rent-A-Center to determine
whether parties could validly delegate to arbitrators the question of
an arbitration agreement’s conscionability or unconscionability.6
Delegations of this sort are extremely common, and often enough
found in boiler-plate provisions of standardized consumer contracts.7
Their importance, even in doctrinal terms, should not be
underestimated. Under traditional severability reasoning, the
question of the conscionability or unconscionability of an arbitration
agreement (as distinct from the main contract as a whole) is a
“gateway” issue for full judicial consideration, if raised at the
threshold of arbitration.8 It has long been the Court’s position that
courts may, upon request, entertain at the outset those validity
challenges that specifically target the arbitration clause, but not those
that pertain to the parties’ whole contract.9 The latter are deemed to
be inextricably tied to the merits of the eventual dispute and thus
reserved for the arbitral tribunal to resolve.10
5. For a fuller version of this argument, see George A. Bermann, The Supreme
Court Trilogy and Its Impact on U.S. Arbitration Law, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
551 (2011) [hereinafter Bermann, Supreme Court Trilogy].
6. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2775.
7. See Bermann, Supreme Court Trilogy, supra note 5, at 553 (describing
Thomas J. Stipanowich’s observation that that the delegation of “threshold issues”
are “ubiquitous”).
8. See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L 1, 44 (2012) [hereinafter Bermann,
International Commercial Arbitration].
9. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04
(1967); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449
(2006) (holding that “a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not
specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator”).
10. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986) (explaining the principle established in prior cases that “in deciding
whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a
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Not all delegations of gateway issues to arbitral tribunals raise the
same level of concern. Arbitration agreements commonly purport to
give the tribunal exclusive authority at the outset to determine
whether a given dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration
agreement.11 Such delegations are generally uncontroversial since
they essentially serve only to enhance the tribunal’s prerogatives of
contract interpretation.12 The courts have been more dubious — and
rightly so — about delegations to tribunals of authority to determine
whether an arbitration agreement was ever formed in the first place13
or, if formed, binds a non-signatory.14 The question of
conscionability lies somewhere between those two extremes.
Determining whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable
does not call into question whether an agreement to arbitrate ever
came into existence, even though it does call into question whether it
is enforceable at law. On the other hand, it surely is not a pure
exercise in contract interpretation, inasmuch as it raises basic fairness
concerns. The question whether a determination of unconscionability
can be delegated is a high-profile one, not merely because it defies
easy categorization, but also because unconscionability has become a
prime tool for courts in policing arbitration agreements in the
consumer context and in denying effect to those they find to be

court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims”).
11. See Bermann, International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 8, at 30
(“Moreover, parties who concede both that they entered into a contract and that the
contract contains a clause submitting all disputes under that contract exclusively to
an arbitral tribunal should fully expect a tribunal, and not a court, to rule on the
validity of the contract if it is called into question.”).
12. See id. (observing that the “presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes
recognizes the greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting
collective-bargaining agreements.”).
13. In China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d
274, 289 (3d Cir. 2003), the court did not decide whether authority to decide the
existence of a contract could be delegated to the arbitrators. But it did hold that the
question is generally for a court rather than a tribunal to decide, even though the
existence question pertained to the contract as a whole rather than to its arbitration
provision in particular. That holding is consistent with the Supreme Court’s dictum
in the case of Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440.
14. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. at 649) (“Courts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’
evidence that they did so.”) (alteration in original).

896

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:4

unfair and to have been entered into unfairly.15
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rent-A-Center
precisely to resolve the question of the enforceability of delegations
of the power to determine the conscionability or unconscionability of
arbitration agreements, and although the decision appears to bless
such delegations, I find that the Court did not put the question
altogether to rest. In fact, it held that Mr. Jackson, the consumer, had
failed to focus his conscionability challenge on the delegation
provision of the arbitration agreement at hand; rather, he had
challenged the validity of the arbitration agreement itself.16 A
majority of the Court reasoned that, just as separability requires a
party objecting to arbitration to challenge a feature specific to the
arbitration agreement and not common to the contract as a whole, so
too does it require a party seeking to challenge the delegation feature
of an arbitration agreement to challenge that feature alone and not
other aspects of the arbitration agreement that he or she might find
objectionable.17 Based on this analogical use of separability, the
Court required the unconscionability challenge to the arbitration
agreement, under the circumstances of Rent-A-Center, to go directly
to the tribunal itself for determination.18
From a doctrinal viewpoint, the majority’s reasoning is deeply
flawed and indeed disingenuous. As ordinarily applied, the
separability doctrine has a solid logical basis. A party that challenges
15. See generally Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the
Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006) (offering empirical
evidence regarding the overuse of the unconscionability doctrine); Karen
Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2011) (recognizing the efficiency and consistency
in deferring judicial review but raising concerns regarding one-sided arbitration
agreements, especially in the consumer context); Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the
Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609 (2009) (noting that unconscionability has been used
successfully with increasing frequency in mandatory arbitration cases over the past
fourteen years); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004) (arguing that
judges have expanded unconscionability beyond its normal area of use in order
because they are generally hostile to arbitration).
16. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779–80 (2010).
17. Id. at 2779.
18. Id.
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an arbitration agreement on the basis of defects unique to it mounts a
fundamental challenge to the arbitral tribunal’s legitimacy, and
indeed to the tribunal’s authority to decide anything, much less the
arbitration agreement’s basic fairness.19 Moreover, determinations
concerning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement do not
implicate the merits of the underlying dispute in the way that
challenges to the enforceability of substantive contract provisions
do.20 On the other hand, if courts are permitted to entertain objections
to an arbitration agreement that can just as easily be lodged against
the contract as a whole, and thereby referred to a court at the
threshold, the arbitrators will be deprived of the possibility of
performing what is surely among their core functions in contract
cases, namely determining whether a contract is or is not
enforceable.21
The basic rationale supporting the separability doctrine (viz. that a
challenge confined to the arbitration agreement should be treated
differently than a challenge extending to the main contract) has no
application to the relationship between parts of the arbitration
agreement itself. A court’s threshold ruling on the validity of an
arbitration agreement’s delegation clause has no direct bearing on —
and certainly will not prejudge — the validity of the arbitration
agreement’s other features.22 In short, there is no rationale and no
justification for splitting up an arbitration agreement into its
component parts and requiring that a party focus on one of its
features to the exclusion of all others. Such a position is at odds with
the very notion of unconscionability, which mandates that judgments
should be based on a totality of the circumstances.23 Why, in any
19. See Bermann, Supreme Court Trilogy, supra note 5, at 554.
20. Id.
21. Cf. S. Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, No. 1:10-CV-2975-AT, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 131344, at *33 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2011) (explaining that the
“arbitrator's duty [is] to apply a rule of law governing contract interpretation to
determine the parties' intent.”).
22. In most U.S. jurisdictions, the substantive prong of any unconscionability
analysis depends entirely on the fairness of the particular provision in question.
23. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (examining the
adhesiveness and the unconscionability of the contract in question “in light of all
of the circumstances presented”); David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13 (2011).
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event, must a party challenging a delegation of authority to decide
unconscionability refrain from mentioning anything else about the
agreement to arbitrate? As a simple matter of logic, a delegation that
is accompanied by other objectionable features in the arbitration
agreement is more serious and detrimental to the consumer’s interest
than a delegation unaccompanied by any such features.24 From that
point of view, these other features are relevant, not because they
themselves are being challenged, but because they heighten the
challenge to the delegation provision.
Objectionable though the use of separability in Rent-A-Center may
be, the fact that a majority of the Court relied on it, and it alone, to
reject Jackson’s challenge to the delegation suggests that Jackson
might arguably have cured his problem through a more careful
pleading. It is true that courts have understood Rent-A-Center as
essentially prohibiting any threshold judicial challenge to an
arbitration agreement’s delegation provision.25 However, I would
dispute that conclusion. Although the Supreme Court was unwilling to
do so in Rent-A-Center, courts may well find that a challenge to an
arbitration agreement is indeed confined to its delegation feature. In
one case, the challenger persuaded the court that her attacks were all
specific to the delegation provision and did not implicate other aspects
of the arbitration agreement or the arbitration agreement as a whole.26
Rightly or wrongly, courts may even choose to view a challenge as
targeting the delegation provision despite the fact that other aspects of
that agreement happen to come under fire as well.27 Finally, at least
24. See Bermann, Supreme Court Trilogy, supra note 5, at 556.
25. See, e.g., Womack v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 4:11 CV 1003 RWS, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138699, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2. 2011) (concluding that in cases
where an arbitration clause has a “clear and unmistakable” agreement to arbitrate
arbitrability, “issues of the clause’s enforceability will be for the arbitrator to
decide unless the provision delegating such authority is specifically challenged”).
26. Howard v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-103, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76342, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. July 28, 2010). The unconscionability challenge failed
on the merits, however. Id. at *15–16.
27. In Washington v. William Morris Endeavor Entm’t, LLC, No. 10 Civ. 9647
(PKC) (JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81346, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011), the
challenger specifically mentioned the delegation provision only once in the course
of its argument that the arbitration agreement was “unfair, one-sided, and the
product of undue influence.” Still, the district court read the challenge as targeting
the delegation provision, construing the argument liberally as a result of the
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one court has interpreted Rent-A-Center as limited to cases in which
the delegation provision is located in a contract clause other than the
arbitration agreement itself.28 The majority in Rent-A-Center did in
fact say that had the consumer “challenged the delegation provision by
arguing that . . . common procedures as applied to the delegation
provision rendered that provision unconscionable, the challenge
should have been considered by the court.”29
I do not mean to minimize the difficulty, in the wake of Rent-ACenter, of mounting a successful threshold attack on a delegation of
authority to determine an arbitration agreement’s conscionability or
unconscionability. The challenger must first somehow persuade a
court that the challenge is focused on the agreement’s delegation
provision. The challenger must then persuade the court that the
delegation provision is itself unconscionable under the relevant
jurisdiction’s prevailing unconscionability doctrine. The examples of
success in these twin showings are few and far between.30 But the
door to such success is simply not closed.
Of course, the Supreme Court is likely to address the
unconscionability challenge to delegation clauses head-on at some
point. The existing case law of the Court suggests that when it does,
it will uphold them. After all, in First Options, decided in the
annulment context, the Court stated squarely that if the parties
clearly and unmistakably delegate to arbitrators the question of
whether a contract binds a non-signatory, the arbitrators’ finding on
that matter will be given deference.31 Similarly, the Court stated in
Granite Rock that parties may delegate to the arbitrators the question
of whether the main agreement was ever formed in the first place.32 If
challenger's pro se status. Id. at *21. The challenge was unsuccessful. Id. at *23–
25.
28. Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Phila., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707, 723 (E.D.
Pa. 2011).
29. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 (2010).
30. Morocho v. Carnival Corp., No. 10-21715-CIV-Martinez-Brown, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4316, at *4 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 14, 2011) (noting that the
challenger’s attack was confined to the delegation provision and therefore
declaring the provision unconscionable).
31. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
32. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
But see Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2784–85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (positing
that a delegation of authority to determine the conscionability of an arbitration
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the Court considers questions of basic assent to arbitration to be
delegable, it will likely consider the question of unconscionability to
be delegable as well.

STOLT-NIELSEN S.A. V.
ANIMALFEEDS INT’L CORP.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Rent-A-Center, it had
already rendered judgment in Stolt-Nielsen, finding class-wide
arbitration sufficiently alien to arbitration to be foreclosed in the
absence of an affirmative indication that class-wide arbitration is
something that the parties had contemplated.33 To reach that result,
the majority had to find — and did find — that class-wide arbitration
is not merely a distinctive species of arbitration, but practically an
altogether different genus.34 In fact, the majority came close to
describing class-wide arbitration as altogether antithetical to
arbitration as it is understood generally.35 Thus, while the majority in
Stolt-Nielsen was certainly justified in pointing out the singular
features of class-wide arbitration, it went a great deal further. To go
that distance, it could not help but give short shrift to some of the
most basic axioms underlying the U.S. law of arbitration — axioms
that, ironically, support the very robustness of arbitration that the
majority claimed to uphold.
What are these axioms? First, the Court sidestepped the
proposition fundamental to U.S. arbitration law to the effect that
arbitrators have broad latitude in fixing the procedural parameters of
an arbitration, unless the parties have stipulated otherwise.36 The fact
agreement directly indicates consent to arbitrate).
33. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776
(2010).
34. See id. at 1775–76 (discussing the considerable and material differences
between bilateral arbitration and class-action arbitration).
35. See id. at 1776 (“[T]he differences between bilateral and class-action
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited
powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class action
arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”). The
majority cited (1) the large number of disputes commonly embraced in class
arbitration, (2) the lack of privacy and confidentiality that class arbitration would
entail, (3) the impact on absent class members, and (4) the ordinarily high
commercial stakes. Id. at 1775–76.
36. See, e.g., Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th
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is that in Stolt-Nielsen, the parties neither expressly embraced nor
rejected class-wide arbitration.37 Though procedural silence is
precisely the circumstance in which arbitral tribunals fill gaps, the
majority foreclosed arbitrators from doing so, turning its back on its
prior ruling in the case of Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,
where it ruled that whether the parties contemplated class arbitration
is a procedural question growing out of the dispute, and therefore one
left primarily to the arbitral tribunal to decide.38
Relatedly, under longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence,
agreements to arbitrate merit broad interpretation.39 The effect of
Stolt-Nielsen, however, was to place class-wide arbitration
presumptively outside the scope of the arbitration agreement to
which the parties could be found to have agreed. The Court would
emphatically reinforce this view in its subsequent ruling in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion.
Third, arbitrators are generally said to be entitled to deference in
the interpretation of arbitration agreements.40 To be sure, this
deference does not extend to all issues. While courts, by definition,
resolve gateway issues if asked to do so, the question of whether the
parties assented to class-wide arbitration is not squarely a gateway
issue, but rather one posed to the arbitrators as contract interpreters.41
Notwithstanding, the Stolt-Nielsen majority did nothing short of
laying down for arbitral tribunals a strict rule of contract
interpretation under which contracts that are silent on the matter of
class-wide arbitration must be understood as foreclosing it.42

Cir. 1997) (quoting Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v.
Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1985)) (“An arbitrator
enjoys wide latitude in conducting an arbitration hearing.”).
37. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766.
38. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003). The Court,
at the same time that Bazzle was decided, recognized that procedural issues arising
in or out of an arbitration are presumptively for arbitrators to resolve. Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002).
39. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (noting that congressional intent promotes “a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements”).
40. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
41. Bermann, Supreme Court Trilogy, supra note 5, at 561.
42. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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If any body of law is meant to supply the canons of construction
applicable to contracts, including arbitration agreements, the Federal
Arbitration Act designates the substantive law of contract of the
relevant state.43 However, the rule of construction of arbitration
agreements announced by the Court is not one to be found in state
contract law. The Court’s subsequent ruling in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion demonstrates that substitution of a federal rule of
contract construction in the arbitration field for the otherwise
applicable state law can produce a decisive difference in outcome. 44
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the majority in Stolt-Nielsen
ultimately vacated the clause construction award issued by the
tribunal45 for what amounts to an error of law. As noted, there is little
by way of precedent to support the majority’s view that, in the
absence of an ascertainable default rule favoring interpretations of
arbitration agreements as contemplating class-wide arbitration, a
court cannot read an arbitration agreement as having that meaning.
But even if the tribunal had erred in failing to follow that rule of
interpretation, error of law on a tribunal’s part does not ordinarily
warrant vacatur.46
I conclude that the majority in Stolt-Nielsen not only came down
very hard on class-wide arbitration so as to ensure that arbitrations
conducted in the United States would rarely proceed on a class-wide
basis, but in doing so also bent some of the most fundamental
principles of U.S. arbitration law. But here too, just as in Rent-ACenter, the apparent decisiveness of Stolt-Nielsen ruling may be
somewhat deceptive.
First, the majority laid great emphasis on the parties in StoltNielsen having expressly stipulated that their agreement was silent as

43. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
44. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)
(holding that “California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the [Federal
Arbitration Act]”).
45. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767–68 (concluding that “what the
arbitration panel did was simply . . . impose its own view of sound policy
regarding class arbitration” rather than “interpret and enforce a contract”).
46. Indeed the majority in Stolt-Nielsen elsewhere expressly acknowledged that
a legal error committed by the tribunal, even if serious, is not ground for vacatur.
Id. at 1767.
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to the availability of class-wide arbitration.47 But not all courts have
understood Stolt-Nielsen as precluding a clause construction award in
favor of class-wide arbitration simply because the arbitration
agreement contains no language, one way or the other, on its
availability. The courts are actually quite divided. While some courts
find that contractual silence on the matter bars tribunals from
ordering class-wide arbitration,48 a larger number regard themselves
as free to infer a willingness to arbitrate on a class-wide basis either
from other language in the contract or, more often, from extrinsic
evidence of one kind or another.49 In Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc.,50
47. Id. at 1776.
48. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that an agreement to class arbitration cannot be
simply inferred); Sanders v. Forex Capital Mkts., LLC, No. 11 Civ. 0864 (CM),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137961, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (holding that a
consumer “must arbitrate his claims” and “must do so on an individual basis, as
there is no provision in the contract which contemplates class arbitration”); Cal.
Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-01341 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71621, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011) (recognizing that “in the absence of a class-wide
arbitration provision, class arbitration would not have been available”); Quinonez
v. Empire Today, LLC, No. C 10-02049 WHA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117393, at
*14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2010) (“If the company had wanted a class arbitration, it
should have written a provision that explicitly contemplated class proceedings and
laid out the appropriate protections.”).
49. See Bergman v. Spruce Peak Realty, LLC, No. 211-cv-127, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 131366, at *11–13 (D. Vt. Nov. 14, 2011) (observing that an arbitration
agreement may contain an implicit authorization of class arbitration); S.
Commc’ns Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, No. 1:10-CV-2975-AT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131344, at *33 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2011) (stating that to hold “that an arbitrator
should automatically assume the parties intended to preclude class arbitration any
time class proceedings are not explicitly authorized in writing would require the
Court to ignore the arbitrator's duty to apply a rule of law governing contract
interpretation to determine the parties' intent”); YAHOO! Inc. v. Iversen, No. 11CV-03282-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117149, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011)
(quoting Vazquez v. ServiceMaster Global Holding, Inc., No. C 09-05148 SI, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69753, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2011)) (stating that
interpretation of an arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law, and
state law generally permits a decisionmaker to “look beyond the four corners of the
contract where appropriate”); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., Civil Case No.
10-2069 (FSH) (PS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115534, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2011)
(rejecting the notion that Stolt-Nielsen stands for the proposition that class
arbitration is prohibited “in any case in which the arbitration clause is silent on the
issue”); Hayes v. Servicemaster Global Holdings, Inc., No. C 10-03887 SI, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70160, at *12–13 n.3 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2011) (reasoning that
an arbitration clause need not explicitly mention that the parties agree to class
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for example, the Second Circuit found the arbitrator to have acted
within the scope of her authority, as well as within the bounds of
state contract law, when she construed a contract to permit class
arbitration even though it contained no provision on the subject. 51
This is not an isolated case, 52 even if it remains exceptional.
arbitration in order for a decisionmaker to find that they did so consent); Aracri v.
Dillard's, Inc., No. 1:10cv253, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41596, at *10–11 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (distinguishing Stolt-Nielsen on account of the parties’
stipulation that the agreement was silent on class arbitration); Sutter v. Oxford
Health Plans LLC, Civ. No. 05-2198 (GEB), Civ. No. 10-4903 (GEB), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17123, at *12–16 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011) (concluding that an
arbitrator could reasonably find consent to class arbitration even if agreement is
silent on the issue); Botello v. COI Telecom, L.L.C., No. SA-10-CV-305-XR,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138572, at *16 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2010) (observing the
silence in arbitration agreement of the parties but concluding that standing alone
they do not preclude class arbitration); La. Health Serv. Indem. Co. v. Gambro A
B, 756 F. Supp. 2d 760, 768 (W.D. La. 2010) (concluding that the arbitral tribunal
applied legal principles, not their own policy choices, in finding action could
proceed on a class basis); Angermann v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, No. 10cv-00711-REB-MJW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123145, at *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 8,
2010) (noting that although there is nothing in a contract to suggest that the
“parties contemplated class-wide arbitration, the question whether class-wide
arbitration is appropriate is for the arbitrator”).
50. Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2011).
51. Id. at 127. See also Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract
and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1154–55 (2011) (describing pre-StoltNielsen approaches to clause construction awards).
52. In Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Grp., Inc. v. Passow, No. 10-11498EFH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4495, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2011), the court
ruled as follows:
In Stolt-Nielsen, “the parties stipulated that there was 'no agreement' on the issue of
class-action arbitration.” Here, there was no such stipulation and … [the] arbitrator
ruled that the parties intended that class-action claims and relief were contemplated
and permitted by the [arbitration agreement] and the Court concludes that the language
of the [agreement] supports such a ruling.
The arbitrator found that the arbitration clause … was broad in its reach, covering “any
claim that, in the absence of this Agreement, would be resolved in a court of law under
applicable state and federal law.” The arbitrator noted that “any claim” is defined as
“any claims for wages, compensation and benefits” and that both the FLSA and
Massachusetts wage laws statutorily authorize an individual employee to bring a classaction in a court of law. The arbitrator further found that the [agreement] expressly
provided that the “[a]rbitrator may award any remedy and relief as a court could award
on the same claim,” that the applicable statutes provide for class relief and the statutes
were in existence when the DRA was executed. The arbitrator also noted that “wage
and hour claims like those in play here are frequently pursued as class or collective
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AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION
It would appear from the foregoing that a majority of the Supreme
Court thought it necessary, in order to fortify arbitration against the
consumer-driven challenges posed by the Rent-A-Center and the
Stolt-Nielsen decisions, to depart from a number of established
understandings about the U.S. law of arbitration — not that it
acknowledged doing so. But it also appears that neither ruling puts a
categorical end to the challenges to arbitration that those two cases
raise.
Much the same can be said about the third decision in the Supreme
Court trilogy, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. In Concepcion, a
majority of the Court held that the federal interest in arbitration,
embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act, barred the courts of
California from declaring class-wide arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts to be unconscionable and unenforceable.53 According to the
majority, applying California unconscionability doctrine in the
fashion the California courts had done discriminated against
arbitration in violation of the FAA, notably by frustrating the
agreement between the parties disallowing the class-wide arbitration
of disputes.54 Despite the FAA’s having made enforcement of
arbitration agreements subject to basic state contract law principles,
application of California unconscionability law in that fashion was

actions, and both [parties] must be deemed to understand that.”
The arbitrator's award was the result of a reasonable interpretation of the [agreement].
Given this Court's limited standard of review, such interpretation must stand.

53. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
54. Id. at 1747-48. See, for example, Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d
766 (8th Cir. 2011); Jones v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 11-10887, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
23586, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 22, 2011) (per curiam); Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655
F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Bernardi, No. C 11-03992 CRB,
No. C 11-04412 CRB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124084, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
2011); King v. Advance Am., Cash Advance, Ctrs., Inc., Civil Action No. 07-237,
Civil Action No. 07-3142, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98630 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011);
Valle v. Lowe's HIW, Inc., No. 11-1489 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93639, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011); Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Colo.
2011); and Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, No. 8:10-CV-2463-T-33TGW, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49231, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2011), for decisions following
the rule in Concepcion.
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effectively preempted.55
Curiously, if the decision in Stolt-Nielsen served its intended
purpose, the decision in Concepcion should not even have been
necessary. That ruling, it will be recalled, sought to ensure that no
dispute would be subject to class-wide arbitration unless the parties
affirmatively evidenced that intention, presumably by express
language in the arbitration agreement.56 Both logic and experience
tell us that in the wake of Stolt-Nielsen, class-wide arbitration
waivers in consumer contracts may no longer be necessary.
But apart from that, the Concepcion ruling, like Rent-A-Center and
Stolt-Nielsen, is both logically flawed and inconsistent with
established understandings of U.S. arbitration. First, the majority in
Concepcion emphatically advanced the view that class-wide
arbitration is at cross-purposes with arbitration’s core objective of
avoiding the complexity, expense, and delay commonly associated
with litigation.57 That position, however, sits uncomfortably with the
Court’s own often-quoted observation, in the case of Volt
Information Services v. Board of Trustees of Stanford University,58
which held that the Federal Arbitration Act is not a federal
endorsement of any single idealized arbitration model — not even
one that is admirably streamlined and efficient.59 If the FAA does not
dictate adherence to any one arbitral design,60 then Justice Scalia is
on shaky ground in suggesting in Concepcion that class arbitration,
on account of its unwieldiness, might not even constitute arbitration
at all.61
55. Section 2 of the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate judicially enforceable,
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
56. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51.
57. Id. at 1749.
58. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
59. Id.
60. See George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties' Intentions in Arbitral
Design, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2009) (indicating that the Supreme
Court’s definition of the “federal interest in arbitration” is not premised on a fixed
arbitration model).
61. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (arguing that class arbitration “is not
arbitration as envisioned by the FAA, lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be
required by state law.”).
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Justice Scalia is right, of course, in suggesting that states cannot,
consistent with the FAA, require parties to subject themselves to fullscale discovery or jury trials in arbitration against their wishes.62
Parties are entitled in principle to do away with any such features of
litigation if that is their preference — a preference they often express
by incorporation institutional rules of arbitration that have precisely
that effect. Were a state to mandate such features in arbitration, by
rendering them non-waivable, it would violate the cardinal principle
that contracting parties have the prerogative to design their own
arbitration.
But the fact that the FAA does not allow states to impose pretrial
discovery and jury trials in arbitration does not mean that states
cannot override party agreements that would jeopardize arbitration’s
basic fairness. The fact is that pretrial discovery and jury trials are
precisely the kind of U.S. litigation features that the FAA and the
jurisprudence under it want parties to be able to avoid.63 More
importantly, California law did not in any event mandate class-wide
arbitration; it merely pledged to enforce class-wide arbitration if the
parties could be said to have agreed to it.64 After Stolt-Nielsen,
agreement to class-wide arbitration will not be easy to establish.
Thus, the reasoning of the majority in Concepcion is flawed not
merely because, as in Stolt-Nielsen, it places class-wide arbitration
outside the realm of arbitration, but also because it wrongly reads
California case law as imposing class-wide arbitration on parties
even if they did not agree to it.
However, the problem with Concepcion is even more basic. When
California courts apply standard unconscionability doctrine to classwide arbitration waivers, they do not in any meaningful way
discriminate against arbitration. California courts treat waivers of
class-wide arbitration no more harshly than they treat waivers of
class action litigation; both kinds of waiver are unenforceable.65
62. Id. at 1747.
63. Cf. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357 (2008) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985)) (“A prime
objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and
expeditious results.’”).
64. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
65. The Concepcions made precisely this argument, citing Am. Online, Inc. v.
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More generally, California law accords agreements to arbitrate no
less favorable treatment than it grants to forum selection clauses
designating a foreign court.66 In barring California from applying its
standard unconscionability doctrine to waivers of class-wide
arbitration, the majority in Concepcion unjustifiably encroached on
the state’s freedom to develop its own general contract law principles
and to apply them to contracts that take the form of agreements to
arbitrate.
But again like Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen, the importance of
Concepcion must not be overstated. As I read it, Concepcion at most
precludes courts from categorically denying effect to waivers of
class-wide arbitration in consumer contracts on grounds of
unconscionability under state contract law.67 But it does not prevent
courts from analyzing arbitration agreements containing class action
waivers under the particular facts and circumstances established in
any given case, with the possibility of denying them enforcement on
a case-by-case basis. Courts need not declare class action waivers
unenforceable per se in consumer contracts when they can reach the
same result through ad hoc decisionmaking. Even in the short time
that has elapsed since Concepcion, lower courts have done precisely
that on a number of occasions.68
Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
at 1746. See Am. Online, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712 (“The unavailability of class
action relief . . . is sufficient in and by itself to preclude enforcement of [a] forum
selection clause.”).
66. California law generally respects and enforces forum selection clauses in
keeping with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat’l
Hockey League Players' Ass’n., 39 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1353, (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(recognizing and upholding the “modern trend favoring enforceability of forum
selection clauses.”); Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.App.3d 411, 419 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (“The law is clearly that forum selection clauses . . . will be enforced
by the California courts.”).
67. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51 (“[C]lass arbitration, to the extent it
is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the
FAA.”).
68. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, Civil Action No. DKC 11-2245, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124839, at *20–21 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2011) (“The Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that Concepcion means that arbitration agreements with
class action waivers must be analyzed under the particular circumstances of each
case and may not categorically be considered either unenforceable or acceptable.”);
Tory v. First Premier Bank, No. 10 C 7326, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110126, at *9–
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CONCLUSION
Through its latest set of arbitration decisions, a Supreme Court
majority has measurably strengthened its commitment to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements, but has done so to the
detriment of consumer protection interests. The fact that the Court
would vigorously pursue its pro-arbitration philosophy is less
surprising than the extent to which it was willing to override
established understandings in the U.S. law of arbitration or the fact
that it did not even acknowledge that it was doing so.
And yet none of the three decisions erects insuperable roadblocks
to those who would defend consumer interests in the arbitration
context. On the contrary, we may anticipate a continuing struggle in
the courts between those who share the Supreme Court majority’s
outlook and those who are prepared resourcefully to resist it, with
both sides straining mightily in order to achieve their objectives.69
Maintaining the arbitrability of consumer disputes under U.S. law is
proving to take an ever greater toll on integrity and principle in the
U.S. law of arbitration.70
13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011); Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., No. SACV 1001936 DOC (MANx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9,
2011); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
The court in Fisher, supra, relied on the Eleventh Circuit decision in Cruz v.
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). In Cruz, the court
enforced a class action waiver because the consumer had based the
unconscionability argument on the very same ground advanced in Concepcion,
namely that the case involved numerous small-dollar claims by consumers against
a corporation, many of which could only be brought on a class basis. But the court
implied that a different and stronger showing might have produced a different
result. Id. at 1214–15; see also Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., No. C 10-04867
SBA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116433, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011). But see
Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C 07-00411, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106783, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (“[I]t is incorrect to read Concepcion as
allowing plaintiffs to avoid arbitration agreements on a case-by-case basis simply
by providing individualized evidence about the costs and benefits at stake.”).
69. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:
Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1420 (2008) (discussing the recent evolution in arbitration law, specifically in
the context of unconscionability, and highlighting the opposing viewpoints that are
accentuated by recent Supreme Court decisions).
70. There is some, albeit halting and irregular, movement toward excluding
consumer contract disputes from arbitration’s domain. Congress has declared a
small number of narrow sectoral contract disputes to be non-arbitrable. See Dodd-
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (granting itself the authority to restrict mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration “between covered persons and consumers in connection with the
offering or providing of consumer financial products or services.”); H.R. REP. NO.
111-230 (2009) (providing for non-waivability of right to a judicial forum for Title
VII sexual harassment claims of employees of federal government contractors).
The latter enactment (in sections 928 and 1028) authorizes the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the newly-created Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) to regulate pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the securities
industry and the consumer financial products and services sector, respectively.
The most general enactment is the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), which in its
latest iteration renders unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements
concerning employment, consumer and civil rights disputes. Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2011, H.R. 1873 § 402, 112th Cong. (2011).

